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THE EVOLUTION OF THE TWO ECONOMIES 
In the last two decades, the GDP growth rate in India has 
been around 5.5% with the economy growing about 2.6 
times reaching a level of about US$510 billion in 2002. In 
China the GDP has been growing at about 9.5 % over the 
same period with the economy growing more than five fold 
between 1982 and 2002 reaching a level of about US$ 
1,232 billion in 2002. The GDP of China, which was about 
1.2 times that of India in 1982, had by 2002 grown to 2.6 
times that of India. In terms of impact of the economic 
growth on poverty reduction, by 2002 China had lifted 400 
million people out of poverty and its poverty rate had 
declined to 4.6%. In India over the same period the poverty 
rate declined from 36% to 29%. 
The structure of the two economies also evolved differently, 
with the share of the agriculture sector declining more 
sharply in China – to less than 15% of GDP in 2002 – while 
in India it was nearly 23%. In India the contribution of 
services to GDP grew to above 50%; in China services 
contributed 33.7 %. In India, industry share of GDP is about 
27% and in China it is 52%. Moreover, by 2002/2003, the 
amount of foreign direct investment and volume of trade in 
China have reached a level that is many times of those in 
India. On balance, the Chinese economy has thus become 
more freight transport-intensive than that of India. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGHWAYS AND 
RAILWAY IN FRASTRUCTURE 
At the beginning of the 1990s, India’s highway and 
railway infrastructure was ahead of those in China in 
terms of total route km, route km/square km, and route 
km/head of population, but the utilization of the 
infrastructure, particularly for railways, was quite different. 
India’s road network was more extensive than that 
of China in 1992, but the quality of the road 
networks in both countries was severely deficient 
relative to the standards of modern highways in 
virtually all dimensions – pavements, road geometry, and 
traffic management. Informal evidence1 suggests that the 
quality of the two road networks was roughly on a par, 
except that China had perhaps generally better road 
maintenance. The  uncontrolled mixing of pedestrians, 
animals, and other slow moving traffic was similar in both 
countries, contributing to slow travel speeds, uncertain 
journey times, and high accident rates. 
 
 
                                                    
1 Clell Harral, formerly Highway Design and Maintenance Advisor 
to the World Bank, traveled several thousands of km of highways 
in both India (1964-2003) and China (1980-1990). 
Table 1. Key Economic Data for India and China, 
1992-2002 
 India China 
 1991- 
92 
2001- 
02 
1992 2002 
Population 
(million) 
846 1,000 1,171 1300 
Poverty rate 
(%) 
36 29 40 7 
GDP (current $ 
billion) 
244.2 510.2 454.6 1,233 
GDP growth rate 
(%) 
5.5 4.4 14.4 8.0 
Share of GDP 
(%) – Industry 
26.7 26.6 43.9 51.7 
Share of GDP  
(%) - Services 
42.3 50.7 34.3 33.7 
Volume of trade 
(current $ billion) 
46 157 165 623 
Foreign direct 
investment 
current $ billion) (
1.8 4 11 53 
 
Source: World Bank “India at a Glance” and “China at a Glance”. 
http://www.cpirc.org.cn/yjwx/yjwx_detail .asp?id=3204 for China 
data. 
In 1992, the two railways then carried almost 
exactly the same volume of passenger km (pkm, 314 
vs 315 billion), while China Railways (CR) managed 
to carry 1,157 billion ton km (tkm) of freight – or 
4½ times that of Indian Railways (IR) of 257 billion 
tkm – through far more efficient exploitation of track, 
locomotives, and wagons, and by assigning lower priority to 
passenger services. IR operations were dominated by 
passenger services (including suburban operations, a 
burden not imposed on CR), but, reflecting the fact that 
India’s citizens enjoyed a far higher propensity to travel, the 
314 billion pkm carried by IR constituted only 20% of 
India’s estimated total passenger pkm, while the 315 billion 
pkm via CR constituted 45% of China’s estimated total 
passenger market. The share of both railways in their 
respective freight markets had already substantially eroded 
over the preceding two decades as trucking, coastal 
shipping, and, in China, also inland water transport took an 
ever larger share. IR’s share stood at 45% in 1992, slightly 
superior to that of CR at just under 40%.2
                                                    
2 Traffic statistics for the railways sector may be reasonably 
accurate, but statistics for other modes, particularly roads, are 
subject to wide margins of error, so that reported modal share 
should be taken as indicative at best; published estimates vary 
widely: e.g. Pittman (2004) reports CR’s current share at an 
implausible 70-80 % of surface freight transport. 
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Over the ensuing decade (1992-2002), China’s 
highway and railway development overtook that of 
India’s. 
 Having started the development of a National Trunk 
Highway System (NTHS)3 in 1992, China took 
advantage of the macro-economic slowdown following 
the Asian financial crisis that began in 1997 to more 
than double its spending on highways, from US$13 
billion in 1997 to US$30 billion per annum or more 
during the ensuing years. Highway building is estimated 
to have increased China’s GDP by a full 2 % per annum 
over the subsequent years. India's road expenditures 
averaged only US$1 billion to US$3 billion per annum 
during this decade. 
 China’s Rail network extension and capacity 
expansion also exceeded that in India, as the double-
tracked network was extended by 69% (+9,400 km), 
electrified track km doubled (+8,975 km), and the 
overall network route km extended by 24% (+13,797 
km). The latter included 12,367 km built by new local 
rail corporations, many with private participation, owned 
and operated separately from the National Railway, 
unlike India, where IR retained a monopoly for rail 
services. The investment in the government owned 
railways during the decade 1992-2002 in China and 
India was US$ 85 and 17.3 billion, respectively. The 
increment in annual freight traffic (from 1,157 to 1,551 
= 394 billion tkm) taken on by CR over 1992-2002 
exceeded the entire freight traffic carried by Indian 
Railways in 2002 (336 billion tkm), reflecting, among 
other things, the far greater freight intensiveness of 
China’s economy. 
It was in the highways sector, however, where the 
contrast, in both objectives and achievements, was 
greatest. While India's road network officially grew by 
600,000 km (from 2.7 to 3.3 million km, or 22%), virtually 
all of the increase was in very low-standard roads to reach 
more of the rural areas which had before been outside the 
reach of all weather access. High standard arterial 
highways to connect the four main cities of India were 
largely neglected; the effort to widen the 6,500 km Golden 
Quadrilateral to 4 lanes without controlled access, began in 
1998 and is not expected to be completed before 2005. In 
contrast, China's road network officially grew by only 
443,000 km (from 1.32 to 1.77 million km, or 28%), but 
the emphasis was on the arterial networks. By 2002 some 
25,130 km of access-controlled expressways with 
minimum 4-lanes and another 27,468 km of 4-lane dual 
carriageway highways without controlled access feature 
had been completed, including 27,000 km of the NTHS. 
Over this period, India's rail network grew by only 682 
route km (1%), double track by 1,519 km (10%), and 
electrified line by 5,192 km (48%). Interestingly, IR’s gain 
in annual traffic carried per US dollar of investment (14.9 
tkm+pkm) over the decade was more than twice (2.2 
times) that of China Railways (6.8 tkm+pkm), but the gain 
in labor productivity was only 61% (from 402 to 648 
tkm+pkm) vs the 90% gain on CR (from 728 to 1385 
tkm+pkm). Apparently CR spent extra capital partly to 
purchase improved labor productivity, to achieve an 
3 This is a program to develop 35,000 km of expressway 
network of 12 corridors in the country, planed to be completed 
by 2020. By 2002, however, about 27,000 km (or 77%) of 
the NTHS have been completed. The government has since 
decided to push up the completion date to 2007. 
average output per employee more than twice (2.1 times) 
that of IR. It is also the perception that CR has developed 
rail line capacity that would cater to growth of demand 
over the next 10 years or so while India has not done so. 
Finally, CR has invested heavily to ease the shortage and 
improve availability of wagons to its clients. 
In sum, after suffering from transport constraints 
impinging on its economic growth for more than a decade 
since the start of the economic reforms and liberalization in 
1978, China decided in the early 1990s to address the 
problem head on. A choice was made to build 
capacity not merely to alleviate the most serious 
immediate bottlenecks on its existing, largely 
outmoded transport infrastructure, but to go 
beyond and build a high-capacity system of modern 
highways and railways that would provide for 
future needs as well. This would smooth the path 
for sustained future growth for the rapidly growing 
coastal provinces, and extend improved economic 
opportunity to the vast population residing in its 
distant, impoverished hinterlands. It appears that 
rapid capacity expansion on highways and railways has 
contributed significantly to the high economic growth rate 
in China. Indeed, it is doubtful whether China could have 
sustained its rapid growth without addressing the serious 
constraints in its transportation system. 
How did China accomplish this extraordinary 
breakthrough? Does its experience suggest 
development options and offer lessons learned that 
could be considered by policy makers in India 
today, as it faces many similar problems to those 
faced by China in 1992? This paper addresses these 
questions first for the highways sector and subsequently 
for the railways sector. 
HIGHWAYS 
Key Strategies Pursued by China. In achieving the 
rapid expansion of its arterial highway network, China had 
to overcome two basic constraints: (i) highway finance, 
and (ii) physical implementation capacity, including 
planning, design, tendering, and supervision of 
construction. 
HIGHWAY FINANCE 
The huge increase in funding for highways was 
accomplished through a wide spectrum of 
measures, several of which have the characteristics 
of temporary expedients that will have to be 
substantially restructured or replaced over the long 
run. The great majority of financing for roads in China has 
been secured from public sources, either directly from the 
government budget or through government borrowings or 
guarantees. About one-quarter of new construction 
expenditures came from China’s road user charges system 
– the Road Maintenance Fee (US$10 billion in 2002), the 
Vehicle Purchase Fee (US$ 4.5 billion), and the Highway 
Transport Management Fee(US$2.5 billion). Although 
authorized by the new road law in 1998, the Government 
of China has so far been unable to agree on a fuel tax for 
road construction; consequently vast additional sums had 
to be sought elsewhere. 
A notable feature over recent years (particularly 
since the explosion of expenditures from 1997) is 
that virtually half of road development has been 
financed by domestic bank loans guaranteed by 
local government and by central government bond 
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proceeds which were on-lent to local governments.4 
This mode of finance is unlikely to be sustainable at these 
magnitudes over time. 
Tolling of improved roads was already introduced and 
widely practiced in China prior to initiation of the NTHS 
program, and it was decided from the beginning that the 
NTHS (like most other major new roads) would be 
operated as toll facilities. That decision, of course, did not 
provide the immediate finances for construction of the 
network or its initial years of operation before growth of 
traffic generated significant revenues. Financing of the 
construction of the NTHS and other major components of 
the highway development program has involved both 
public and private finance, the latter largely equity, as 
long-term debt from private sources has not generally 
been available without government guarantees. 
The application of tolls has also caused important 
operational problems and economic distortions, the 
most significant of which has been substantial traffic 
diversion, reducing both the financial and economic rates 
of return, as older non-tolled facilities have continued to 
carry heavier traffic in many cases than the newer, high 
quality facilities. Fragmentation of ownership and 
operation of the toll network has also caused other 
operational inefficiencies – e.g., more than 300 toll 
stations were reported in place in Guangdong Province 
alone in 2001, with the excessive segmentation 
increasing the costs of construction and operation, 
causing road users much unnecessary delay, and 
magnifying risks for investors and lenders. 
The innovations in road finance, some more 
successful than others, have included extensive 
efforts to engage private finance to complement 
public funding. During 1990-2000, there were more 
than 80 cooperative joint-venture (public-private 
partnership) road projects between Hong Kong 
developers and provincial or municipal authorities which 
mobilized some RMB 75 billion (>US$9 billion) from 
private sources. In addition, since 1996, asset 
securitization (sale of equity in existing toll highway 
companies) raised another RMB 16 billion (US$2 billion) 
through listing of eight expressway development 
companies on the domestic stock exchanges and five in 
Hong Kong.5 The absolute magnitude of private 
finance is thus significant—and quite large relative 
to that achieved in other emerging economies – but 
the total has been well under 10% of the total 
funding committed to road investments in China over 
this period. The disinterest of institutional lenders (such 
as insurance companies and pension funds) in providing 
long-term debt to support road development in China in 
the absence of a government guarantee is a major 
constraint. “In the absence of a well structured legal and 
regulatory framework, most mainland companies do not 
have access to sources of long-term domestic funds from 
institutional investors.6
Arranging sustainable, economically efficient 
sources of finance for a highway system that is still 
expanding rapidly, while at the same time coupling 
with mounting maintenance and rehabilitation 
4 J. Yenny, “China Higwhay Strategy Review”, draft report 
to World Bank (July 27, 2001). 
5 J. Yenny (2001). 
6 M. Bellier and Y.M. Zhou, Private Participation in 
Infrastructure in China (World Bank, 2003), p. 49. 
demands, is yet an unresolved set of issues in 
China. The prospective elements of a long-term solution 
include both a fuel tax and a restructuring of ownership 
and method of collecting tolls, which are expected to 
grow with rapidly rising incomes, personal car ownership, 
and consequent traffic. Bellier and Zhou (2003), provide 
an overview of the potentials of private finance and a 
blueprint for exploiting those potentials for highway 
finance in China. These potentials should not be 
exaggerated, however. The magnitude of funding 
required, the strong public goods characteristics of roads, 
and the particular character of the roads remaining to be 
built in China (primarily lower-volume non-arterial 
networks) are likely to dictate that the dominant portion 
of resources for road development continues to come 
from public funding. 
HIGHWAYS IMPLEMENTATION: PLANNING, DESIGN, 
TENDERINDG, AN SUPERVISION OF CONSTRUCTION 
China was not yet equipped with modern industries for 
highway planning, design, or construction in 1992, and 
the massive expansion of highway construction 
engendered countless challenges. While the problem-
solving capacities of its civil works industries, fueled by 
vast sums of money, and assisted in some key aspects by 
the international community, rose to meet the challenge 
of one of the largest highway building programs ever 
undertaken anywhere, the process of transition of this 
sector to a competitive market-based economy is still a 
work in progress. Today, the industry – in its various 
facets of design, tendering, contracting, supervision and 
quality control – still lingers to a degree in a ‘dual 
economy’ structure: alongside a modern industry with 
world-class capabilities, there remain many vestigial 
enterprises that have not adapted, sustained for now by 
state subsidies in one form or another that distort market 
competition. 
International Competitive Bidding was introduced 
under World Bank financed projects from 1985 and 
competitive tendering of one form or another (whether 
local or international) has since grown to supplant direct 
labor (‘force account’) for most road construction 
projects. 
Construction bureaus were separated from the 
governmental roads authority (Ministry of 
Communications, MOC, at the central level, and the 
Provincial Communications Departments, PCDs, at 
theprovincial level), and over time many have been 
reorganized (at least ostensibly) as financially autonomous 
corporations. 
Competition has been actively promoted. While there 
was a vast expansion of demand for road construction, 
supply was also greatly expanded by encouraging 
participation of construction enterprises from railways and 
other sectors in road construction. Hundreds of 
construction enterprises with modern equipment are now 
said to be qualified to construct expressways. 
FIDIC contract structures and conditions were 
introduced and broadly adopted from the early 
1990s, but its application is still evolving, with some 
important modifications. While there has been growing 
independence of the contractors from the highway 
administration, there is as yet no independent supervision 
industry. The independence of the Resident Supervising 
Engineer (who is selected by competition) is constrained 
(at least in the case of expressways) by a higher Chief 
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Supervision Engineer, who, together with his staff, is 
appointed by and answers directly to the Employer. The 
independence of contractors is also evolving, due to their 
traditional linkage to the government a state owned 
enterprises (SOE) under the centrally planned system, and 
is being addressed as part of the SOE reform and 
introduction of bankruptcy law. 
While quality of construction for arterial highways procured 
under ICB contracts is tightly supervised, there have been 
significant quality problems to be overcome even 
under ICB contracts. One of the causes for the persistent 
quality problem has been the very low bid prices offered by 
quazi SOE contractors. To address this problem, following 
collapse of some bridges in 1999, new laws were passed 
placing lifetime responsibility on designers and contractors 
for faulty design or construction. 
The problem of under-design of pavements – to meet the 
official legal limit rather than the actual much heavier 
loadings – has so far defied resolution, with the result that 
China will soon be facing large outlays for pavement 
strengthening that could have largely been deferred by 
several years at low marginal cost. By contrast India has 
tackled this problem by designing pavements for actual 
axle loads as determined from load surveys. 
Today China has 240 design institutes that can design any 
highway short of expressway standards and 79 design 
institutes that are qualified to design expressways. The 
total technical staff is said to number more than 60,000 
engineers. 
ARE THERE POTENTIAL LESSONS LEARNED FOR 
INDIA’S HIGHWAY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT? 
Required expansion of resources for highways 
development. After under-investing in highways for 
decades, China increased its allocations for highways by a 
factor of nearly 40 times over 1991-2002, from about 
US$1 billion to 38 billion, or 3.1% of GDP in 2002. 
Similarly, large increases in funding for highways in India 
would be necessary to modernize its highway networks on 
a comparable scale. 
Source of finance. While China raised some $11 billion 
from private investors in highways, this amounted to less 
than 10% of the total investments. However, a recent 
study by the World Bank7 suggests that the better 
established capital markets and associated legal 
infrastructure in India offer superior prospects for 
private participation in highway finance. Moreover, 
the arterial networks which are yet to be built in India may 
provide attractive opportunities for Private-Public 
Partnerships, if appropriately structured and managed. The 
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) have 
been asked to support the national highway authority of 
India in establishing a major PPP program to tap private 
capital markets to augment public funding for highways, 
and the prospects appear good. However, for this to be 
realized, substantial increases in state funding of 
highways will be required to provide the public 
share for a massive expansion of the total program, 
even if the public contributes the lesser share. Public 
participation up to 40% of construction costs should 
                                                    
7 World Bank, “Private Finance of Highways in India: An 
Assessment” South Asia Energy and Infrastructure Unit (SASEI) 
(January 2004a). 
support a substantial PPP program of highways 
development.8
Cost recovery: tolls, taxes, and other road user 
charges. While China has not yet implemented a 
significant fuel levy and has placed reliance instead on 
direct tolling as the primary source of cost recovery to 
meet debt service and dividends on private equity, it is as 
yet unclear whether this strategy will ultimately prove 
successful, and, if so, in what time frame. What is already 
clear is that the tolls and the proliferation of toll collection 
stations have caused substantial economic and financial 
distortions from under-utilization of new high standard 
highways and continued congestion of existing lower-
standard but untolled routes. In this context, India should 
avoid repeating China’s mistakes in this respect and choose 
a more efficient way of effecting cost recovery. Until such 
time as revolutionary new technologies may be 
invented that permit tolling of all highways (or any 
chosen sub-set thereof, separately for each type of 
vehicle), India’s current choice to place primary 
reliance on fuel levies (the central road fund), 
complemented by direct tolling only where the 
demand for the tolled facility is highly inelastic, is 
the appropriate one. A study of India’s policy options for 
comprehensive road user charges encompassing economic 
as well as financial dimensions has recently been 
undertaken by the World Bank.9 No similar study of 
China’s user charges policy options was uncovered during 
the preparation of this paper. 
Choice of investment priorities and design 
standards. China chose to give first priority to 
development of its arterial networks, and allocated 60% of 
a vastly expanded road sector budget for more than a 
decade to achieving that outcome. Moreover, for the 
arterial networks it chose high design standards, 
including access control features, from the earliest stage 
of construction, resulting in high initial costs. India’s 
decision makers have until now made very different 
choices, choosing first to emphasize feeder networks 
linking local markets with the low cost all-weather access, 
and only in 1998/1999 started the National Highway 
Development Project - a program to four-laning about 
13,000 km of its core national highway network, without 
limited access features. We have seen no systematic 
quantitative analysis to justify the strategy in either 
country, but Indian officials have commented that the 
latter choice was dictated in part by the difficulties in 
India of securing the right-of-way to permit higher 
standards, including access controls, and in part by 
budgetary constraints. Unfortunately, recent road travel 
in India has revealed that the issue of mixed traffic 
remains a major problem (generating both congestion 
and accidents) on those widened roads where access has 
not been restricted, and subsequent upgrading will be 
more costly than it would have been if done originally. At 
8 In December 2003, there were press reports that the 
Government had decided to limit the public participation to 
25% of construction costs. We understand that the 
proposal has since been withdrawn. 
9 World Bank, “Highway Finance in India: Policy Note, 
“South Asia Energy and Infrastructure Unit (SASEI) 
(January 2004b). 
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the opposite extreme, in China there are reportedly many 
segments of costly access-controlled facilities that have 
limited traffic and may remain underutilized for years, 
even if the toll diversion is eliminated. The optimal 
solution likely lies somewhere between the two 
extremes chosen by India and China, and will often 
vary from segment to segment of the network. 
What is striking is that this problem is one that can 
be quantitatively analyzed with time staging 
options for alternative design standards, using the 
planning tools already available in both countries. 
The lesson in this case is that the choice of design 
standards should be properly analyzed and 
determined on a project-by-project basis. 
RAILWAYS 
Comparative financial and operational performance. 
The total transportation output (measured in “equated 
units” = passenger km+ton km) of China Railways (CR) 
was about two and half times that of Indian Railways (IR) 
in 1992 as well as in 2002. Over this decade, the 
performance of CR has come to surpass in most 
dimensions that of IR by a wide margin, including: 
 Network length and standards 
 Realized throughput capacity 
 Labor and equipment productivity (locomotives, 
wagons, coaches) 
 Maintenance of assets 
 Financial profitability 
 Self financing capability through rail construction 
surcharge 
 Restructuring, including separation of non core 
business and introduction of incentives for managers. 
A summary of reported financial results for IR and CR is 
given in table 2. The operating ratio for IR is shown to 
have deteriorated from 0.90 in 1991/92 to 0.96 in 2002. 
The operating ratio for CR is much healthier at 0.74 in 
2002 (based on operating revenue plus construction 
surcharge). 
It is to be noted that IR’s operating ratio of 0.96 is 
substantially understated, as the provision of depreciation is 
well below actual requirements. If IR were to make 
adequate provision for annual asset renewal, a 
fortiori if it were to make adequate provision for the 
large backlog of overdue equipment and track 
renewals, as well as pension accruals, in normal 
commercial accounting term, it is very likely that IR 
would be a heavily-loss-making entity – in fact one 
well along the path toward bankruptcy, if it were 
not state owned. 
On the expenditure side, IR’s staff costs account for 
53% of working expenses, while on CR these costs 
are only 25%. It is also noted that all a small portion 
of the passenger services that dominate IR’s 
operations are loss-making. The most extreme case is 
the ‘ordinary stopping trains’ where the cost recovery is 
estimated to be less than 30% while these consume 
scarce line capacity. 
Investment and financing. In the period 1992-2002 
the investment on IR and CR was US$17.3 and US$85 
billion respectively. China has a system of levying a 
Construction Surcharge on freight tariff. The proceeds 
from this are utilized for investments in construction of 
new lines with the approval of the Planning Commission 
and the State Council. Further, CR’s operating ratio is 
healthier than that of IR leading to surplus that has been 
used for investment. In the five years to 2002, 57% of 
investments on CR were funded by internal accruals 
(including construction surcharge) as compared with 35% 
on IR. The rest of the funding on CR was from borrowing 
(32%) and other sources including government (11%). 
IR obtained remaining investment funding from market 
borrowing (31%) and government (34%). CR pays taxes 
on profits. 
 
Table 2: Financial Results for IR and CR, 1991/2-2001/2 
  INDIA   CHINA  
 
1991-92 2001-02 
Ratio 
1991-92/ 
2001-02 
1992 2002 Ratio 
1992-2002 
Employees total (million) 1.65 1.51 0.91 3.41 1.76 0.51 
Operational employees (est. million) 1.42 1.3 0.91 2.04 1.39 0.68 
Output per operational employee 1000 
equated units 
402 648 1.61 728 1,385 1.90 
Transportation revenue (billion) INR 137 INR 378 2.76 RMB 69.9 RMB 142.0 2.96 
Operating expenses & pensions (billion) INR 104 INR 343  RMB 24.6 RMB 112.0  
Depreciation INR 20 INR 20  RMB 13.5 RMB 22.3  
Total working Expenses including 
depreciation and pensions 
INR 124 INR 363 2.92 RMB 35.8 RMB 134.3 3.75 
Working ratio % 0.76 0.94  0.35 0.62  
Operating ratio % 0.90 0.96  0.51 0.74  
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HOW DID CHINA RAILWAYS ACHIEVE HIGHER 
OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY? 
Physical features. In China, railways has been growing 
rapidly, and consequently much of its system is new, 
incorporates higher design standards, has high service 
reliability and requires less maintenance and less 
downtime. Moreover, maintenance of older assets is also 
performed in a timely manner to high standards, so that 
equipment downtime is low and full productivity is 
generally sustained. IR, on the other hand, has relatively 
older assets that, even when new, did not 
incorporate performance standards that have since 
become industry standards. Furthermore, many of 
its assets (including way and structures, 
locomotives, wagons, and coaches) are not always 
in a satisfactory state of repair. Speed restrictions, 
failures of rolling stock and infrastructure affect not only 
the productivity of the particular asset, but, given system 
interdependencies, also propagate shock waves and 
reduce the throughput capacity of broader network 
segments. 
Institutional factors - Commercial objectives and 
competition. Although China’s national railways, like 
Indian Railways, are still part of the Ministry of Railways 
(MOR), CR has placed increasing emphasis on 
commercial focus and financial performance. Increase in 
passenger fares to achieve financial viability for 
passenger service was an important step. From 1999, 
Chinese MOR introduced an assets operation liability 
system (AOLS) under which MOR entered into 
management contracts with the 14 Regional 
Railway Administrations (RRAs), which are 
engaged in a closely monitored competition, with 
clear benchmark performance indicators, 
management in centives (both positive and 
negative) to encourage profitability rather than 
physical targets. The best performing managers 
receive significant financial and other incentives, while 
poor performers are quickly identified and removed. 
CR has undergone major restructuring since 1999, 
a vertical dis-integration that has separated non-
core activities and cut CR staffing rosters by half, 
down to 1.7 million employees. In accordance with 
modern railway management structures in almost all 
countries today, many of CR’s former social services 
(education and health services) have been divested, as 
have 38 construction units, 4 railway design units, and 
extensive manufacturing facilities (for locomotives, 
coaches, wagons, signaling and communications 
equipment, and track components). In addition, in a first 
step to deal with non-economic branch lines, about 100 
such line segments have been separated from main lines 
on an accounting basis. Three special purpose companies 
have also been created to handle containers, special 
cargo (oversized and perishable cargos), and Post and 
Parcels. 
The advent of the local and joint venture railways under 
separate management from MOR could ultimately prove a 
stepping stone in the direction of opening the railway 
operations to competition, and a new law has been 
passed to permit foreign investment in China’s railway 
sector, in accordance with the World Trade Organization 
articles. 
 
Table 3. Cost and Fare Structure for IR and CR, 
2002 
 IR CR 
Passenger pkm of total output % 59 24 
Passenger revenue of total % 30 41 
Average cost per equated unit US 
cent 
0.75 0.65 
Average freight tariff per tkm US 
cent 
1.6 0.96* 
Average pass. fare per pkm US cent 0.55 1.25 
*Including construction surcharge of 0.4 c 
CR has managed passenger business quite 
differently – cross subsidy from freight traffic to 
passenger traffic, while still prevailing in IR, has 
been all but eliminated in CR. Till the late 1980s, 
government controlled tariffs did not cover cost of 
passenger services. In order to minimize losses CR kept 
the volume of passenger business low. The seats on trains 
were rationed and prospective rail passenger had to wait 
weeks for a seat allocation. With the transition to market 
economy it was apparent that this situation would not be 
sustainable. To help address this problem, the Chinese 
Government decided to allow CR to substantial fare 
increases to cover costs plus an element of profit. 
Passenger services have been separated on an accounting 
basis. Once this was achieved, CR then started increasing 
capacity for passenger trains. In the decade under review 
CR’s passenger throughput (pkm) increased by 58% and 
the revenue by 130%. The table below shows the cost and 
fare structure for 2002. It is significant that unit cost per 
equated traffic unit on CR is 15% lower than that on IR and 
freight tariff on CR is 30% lower than that on IR, while the 
average passenger fare on CR is almost twice the average 
cost per equated traffic unit. Significantly, CR’s ratio of 
revenue per passenger km to ton km, which had been less 
than 1 in 1992, stood at 1.3 in 2002. For Indian Railways, 
this ratio stood at only 0.34. 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM CHINA RAILWAYS 
CR’s improved performance can be attributed largely 
to six interrelated groups of factors: 
 Better focused, less conflicted objectives of the 
government owner, which is seeking an increasingly 
market-based commercial determination of price and 
outputs, relatively free of unprofitable public service 
obligations (PSO) and employment generation 
demands, and is willing to grant railway management 
related autonomy to achieve the agreed objectives, 
together with the associated accountabilities. 
 Senior management appeared to have strong 
commitment to reform to achieve efficiency and 
profitability, backed by strong individual and collective 
incentives. 
 Undertaking large scale restructuring, including 
separation of non-core activities and outsourcing. 
 Introduction of quasi-competition in rail operations 
(benchmarking of RRAs) 
 Superior financial management, including at least five 
key facets: (i) Willingness of the government to accept  
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market-based pricing principles and output decisions 
for passenger as well as freight transport; (ii) 
implementation of modern accounting/information 
systems on costs and profit/loss of specific lines of 
business, services, and facilities; (iii) better 
maintenance of assets; (iv) application of available 
investment funds to most productive uses; (v) 
availability of larger investment budgets; and 
 Introduction of privatization through local railway joint 
ventures and corporatization with sale of shares in 
existing railway units (including listing in the New York 
as well as Hong Kong stock exchanges). 
What Did China Railways Not Do? 
 CR did not develop sufficient capacity for freight 
transport in time to meet the demand from increased 
imports and domestic consumption. CR is now 
struggling to keep up with demand for freight 
transport. 
 CR has not created an enabling environment for 
attracting private capital. In fact, recently it cancelled 
the existing system of private ownership of freight 
wagons. It has thus missed an opportunity of sourcing 
private capital for rolling stock that would have helped 
alleviate the current wagon shortage. 
 Unlike IR (in the case of Concor), CR was slow in 
providing enabling environment for movement of 
containers by rail. As a result most container traffic in 
China moved by road. CR has recently established a 
company that would focus on rail transport of 
containers. 
 Although CR has taken several steps to separate its 
non core business and has been formulating plans for 
restructuring for some years, it has not yet been able to 
establish a road map for separation of ministry 
functions (policy and regulation) from the operational 
railway responsible for the enterprise. 
ARE THERE POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR INDIA’S 
RAILWAYS DEVELOPMENT? 
IR is facing the same problem that railways in many other 
countries have had to face: a loss of monopoly position, 
and with it the need to adapt to a competitive 
environment. IR has been losing market share to road 
transport in both passenger and freight services. Unless it 
improves its commercial orientation, IR’s position in freight 
will further erode as India upgrades its highways network, 
and its premium passenger services may lose to an 
increasingly competitive aviation industry. The only unique 
aspect of IR is its scale of operations and the sheer size of 
its labor force. These make IR’s adaptation more difficult, 
but not less urgent. In comparison, CR has been 
confronted with the similar changing environment, but has 
begun its process of transformation to meet the 
challenges, with measurable initial results. 
To realize IR’s full potential contribution to India’s 
transport system and economic growth, substantial 
investment will be required to fund track modernization, 
capacity expansion and safety enhancement. However, as 
the CR experience shows, such investment needs to be 
undertaken in conjunction with pragmatic actions by the 
government and IR to address the railways’ institutional 
performance issues. GOI needs to signal its strategy 
for IR. Several of the changes necessary to allow IR 
to compete effectively in the transport market, and 
to fulfill the railways’ potential, are outside the 
direct control of Railway management and requires 
strategic policy direction from GOI. These include the 
phasing out of cross-subsidies between freight and 
passengers, and between the core commercial railway and 
the network of non-commercial lines and services. 
Rightsizing of the labor force and de-politicization of 
investments will also require a clear expression of political 
will by GOI. The GOI has to decide that it desires IR to 
function as a commercial entity. 
In particular, the Government, as Owner, needs to: 
 resolve the conflict between the objectives it has 
imposed on IR – on the one hand, the ostensible 
obligation to operate as a commercial organization, 
and on the other, the very real social obligations, 
including the loss making ordinary rail passenger 
services (although very often these services could be 
provided far more efficiently and to higher standard by 
road transport), maintenance of uneconomic levels of 
employment and a long list of politically/socially 
motivated investments that continue to divert scarce 
investment resources from profitable investments 
critically needed to reduce congestion and improve 
service standards on the arterial mainlines; 
 refrain from interference in the day-to-day 
management of railway operations, but, in return for 
the granting of management autonomy, impose an 
effective system for contracting performance targets 
with IR Management, monitoring them in a 
benchmarking competition, and holding Management 
accountable, including significant positive incentives for 
managers and labor forces. 
IR Management and Labor could: 
(a) In terms of its operations: 
 Recognize that the performance of IR in terms of 
productivity of labor, equipment, and 
infrastructure is a fraction of the productivity of 
CR and other well run railways; 
 Invest in areas that would help increase 
utilization of existing assets, reduce unit costs 
and increase profit margins, e.g., technology 
improvement in signaling, more powerful 
locomotives, modern train control systems, IT, 
etc.; 
 Invest in improving maintenance of infrastructure 
and rolling stock so that these are used to full 
potential and loss of capacity due to failures and 
speed restriction is reduced; 
 Invest in improving quality of service, both for 
freight and passenger services in order to compete 
for high margin traffic; and 
 Invest for capacity enhancement on corridors 
where additional traffic is expected. 
(b) In terms of its management structure 
 recognize that the prolonged period of protection 
of IR from inter-modal competition (road and 
airlines) will be coming to an end in the near 
future; 
 restructure IR, separating non-core functions (not 
only social services but also manufacturing 
services to create a competitive railway supply 
industry) and discarding IR’s traditional functional 
organization in favor of a modern lines-of-business 
structure, centered around the major clients, with 
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the management of each unit focused on meeting 
client service quality requirements, costs, pricing, 
and net revenues to sustain IR in future years; 
 review passenger services (especially ordinary 
trains) and fare structure to reduce cross subsidies 
and reduce freight rates to grow freight business;• 
introduce a modern cost accounting and 
information system that would be able to measure 
performance and profitability of IR as a commercial 
entity; 
 implement a ‘benchmark competition’ system 
across the 16 regional administrations of IR based 
on comparative performance of key indicators, 
particularly, profitability; 
 prepare a long-term (10-15 year) business 
strategy and associated investment plan to enable 
IR to better meet profitable market demands and 
shed unprofitable services and facilities; and 
 implement a new system of capital budgeting and 
investment prioritization based on the Net Present 
Values using the opportunity cost of capital in the 
marginal application that must be forgone. 
The changing operating environments confronted by CR in 
the late 1990s and by IR now are not very different. The 
experience of CR’s reform since 1999 suggests that 
substantial progress is possible, provided that there are 
serious commitment by the leadership in both government 
and railway management, and that an accommodation 
acceptable to the millions of affected laborer is found. 
ANNEX : COMPARATIVE RAILWAY ASSETS AND PHYSICAL PERFORMANCE (1992 AND 2002) 
Comparative network assets and performance of China Railways (CR) and Indian Railways (IR) at 1992 and 2002 are given 
below. 
  INDIA   CHINA 
 
1991- 
92 
2001-02 Ratio 
91-92/ 
01-02 
1992 2002 Ratio 
1992/2002 
Population million 846 1,000 1.18 1,171 1,300 1.11 
Railway route km 
Broad Gauge 
Double track km 
Electrified km 
62,458 
35,109 
14,605 
10,809 
63,140 
45,099 
16124 
(25.5%) 
16001 
(25%) 
1.01 
1.28 
1.10 
1.48 
58,100 
NR53565 
13658(25. 
5%) 
8434(15.7 
%) 
71,897* 
NR 59530 
23,058(38. 
7%) 
17,409(29. 
2%) 
1.24 
1.11 
1.69 
2.06 
Railway track km 109,338 109,227 1.0 106,184 127,949 1.20 
Automatic Block track km 2,594 3,571 1.38 11,287 20,682 1.83 
Passengers carried million 
(non Suburban) 
4,049 
(1637) 
5,093 
(2094) 
1.26 
(1.28) 
997 1,056 1.06 
Average per capita trips per 
year total 
4.78 
(1.93) 
5.09 
 
 
0.85 0.82 
 
Passenger km billion 314 493 1.57 315 497 1.58 
Passenger originating  
market share % 
20 15  11.6 6.6  
Av. Trip length Total  
non-suburban km 
77.7 
153.4 
96.9 
191.6 
1.25 
1.25 
316 471 1.49 
Freight originating tons  
million 
360 522 1.31 1,576 2,043 1.30 
Freight tkm billion 257 336 1.31 1,157 1,551 1.34 
Average haul distance km 714 643 0.90 734 759 1.034 
Freight originating ton  
market share % 
45 30  15.1 14.6  
Equated traffic units 571 829 1.45 1,472 2,048 1.39 
 
Source: Chinese Railways CR Facts 2002 Edition, Indian Railways Year Book 2001-02 and 1992-93 
*In China, Total (71,897 km) consists of National Railway (NR), managed by Ministry of Railways (MOR): 59,530 km; Local Railways 
managed by local governments: 4,716 km, and Joint Venture Railways, jointly funded by governments and enterprises: 7,651 km. Most data 
relates to National Railway 
 
 
